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TRADEMARK EXTORTION REVISITED: A RESPONSE TO 
VOGEL AND SCHACHTER 
KENNETH L. PORT 
INTRODUCTION 
In Volume 103 of the Trademark Reporter, Jason Vogel and Jeremy 
A. Schachter published an article stating that “concerns regarding trade-
mark bullying do not justify new legislation, and instead there are sufficient 
safeguards in the form of sanctions, declaratory judgment actions, reverse 
domain name hijacking provisions, self-help, social media, and Internet 
publicity to address egregious conduct by trademark counsel.”1  They claim 
to agree with the positions of INTA, AIPLA and IPO—that there is nothing 
that can be learned or gained through Congressional action.  They insist, 
rather, that the problem will resolve itself without having to involve legisla-
tion.  I respectfully dissent from these views.  Mr. Vogel and Mr. 
Schachter’s position, as well as the INTA, AIPLA and IPO, is purely anec-
dotal and unsupported by any data.  I provide here an analysis of real cases 
based on real data that suggests that trademark bullying is a significant 
issue.  In fact, the pervasiveness of trademark bullying is, statistically, as 
prevalent as the instances in which money damages are awarded to plain-
tiffs. 
In 2008, I published an article titled Trademark Extortion: The End of 
Trademark Law2 where I discovered and reported alarming trends in 
trademark litigation.  Specifically, the number of cases reaching a trial on 
the merits was falling drastically since the year 2000.  The number of cases 
where damages were awarded and the amount of damages awarded were 
similarly falling—in fact, plaintiffs were awarded money damages only 
5.5% of the time.3  Treble damages were claimed more often but awarded 
less frequently and attorney’s fees also showed decline. These trends oc-
curred even though the number of cases initially filed continued to increase 
over time.4 
 
 1.  Jason Vogel & Jeremy A. Schachter, How Ethics Rules Can Be Used to Address Trademark 
Bullying, 103 TRADEMARK REP. 503, 518 (2013). 
 2.  Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Extortion: The End of Trademark Law, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
585 (2008) [hereinafter Port, Extortion].  
 3.  Id. at 612. 
 4.  See infra Table 1. 
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In Trademark Extortion, I argued that this was evidence that trade-
marks were being used for something other than the assertion of a right.5  
Rather than reducing transaction costs by promoting business goodwill, 
trademark litigation tactics—extortion, if you will—were effectively in-
creasing the cost of market entry for third parties.  Specifically, the evi-
dence suggested that trademarks were increasingly being used as leverage 
against non-competing entities in an effort to coerce them into submission 
of their mark.  This tactic serves to broaden the trademark holder’s rights 
and, thereby, increase the likelihood that the mark will become famous.  
Once famous, competition is no longer relevant where the trademark holder 
asserts a dilution claim6—a claim only available to famous marks.  Con-
versely, where the mark is not famous, the holder must show that it is in 
competition with the alleged infringer, has actual plans to be in competi-
tion, or that competition is in the zone of natural expansion of the plain-
tiff’s goods or services as a prerequisite to recovery.7 
The point of Trademark Extortion was to show that trademark holders 
are using the threat of litigation as an additional vehicle by which they can 
broaden the scope of their trademark rights.  The Constitution and the Lan-
ham Act both contemplate that this broadening will happen through actual 
use of the mark in commerce.  Alarmingly, it seemed to me in 2008 that we 
were embarking on a new course in trademark law and policy in the United 
States where rights were determined by litigation rather than by use. 
For those suffering the consequences of this conduct, the trade organi-
zations and the United States federal government have been remarkably 
disobliging.  Rather, Vogel and Schachter, as well as the INTA, AIPLA, 
 
 5.  Port, Extortion, supra note 2, at 633. 
 6.  See Lanham Act § 43(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2012) (stating that injunctive relief is 
available regardless of the presence or absence of actual or likely confusion) (emphasis added). 
 7.  With this statement, I do not intend here to enter the debate as to the degree of competition 
that is required (or should be required) for a plaintiff to have standing to file suit or enforce its mark.  I 
am only intending to show that the traditional understanding of trademark jurisprudence was/is to 
require competition or the likelihood of competition before a case or controversy exists.  See, e.g., Leah 
Chan Grinvald, Shaming Trademark Bullies, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 625, 636–37 (2011).  To the extent that 
American trademark jurisprudence—mostly in the form of academic commentary—diverges from this 
traditional understanding, it renders the dilution rationale even more irrelevant and, interestingly, 
further incentivizes trademark holders to engage in bullying conduct because they don’t have to show 
that their mark is famous to enjoin a non-competitor, they only have to show that the mark is distinctive 
and/or strong.  Id. at 638. As I have argued elsewhere, dilution rationale is most easily understood when 
the traditional view of trademark jurisprudence is followed.  Kenneth L. Port, The Congressional 
Expansion of American Trademark Law: A Civil Law System in the Making, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
827, 831 (2000). That is, dilution rationale should be applied when the parties are not and will not be in 
competition.  Infringement rationale should be applied when the parties are or will be in competition.  
Practitioners do not make this distinction easy on judges when they claim both infringement and dilu-
tion in the same case.  Under traditional trademark jurisprudence, infringement and dilution ought to be 
mutually exclusive and not applicable to the same set of operative facts.  Judges do not seem to under-
stand this distinction when they find marks infringed and diluted.   
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IPO, and PTO, have joined forces in an effort to convince Congress that 
nothing should be done.  They claim that existing rules, such as Rule 11 
and others, are a sufficient response to trademark bullying, if bullying is 
happening at all.8 
Yet, not only does trademark law permit trademark bullying to exist—
it requires it.9  Trademark holders have a duty to police their marks, as 
acquiescence to another’s use of the same or similar mark on the same or 
similar goods entitles the junior user to a host of defenses to infringement.10  
The AIPLA insists that trademark extortion is essentially the exercise of 
that duty. The proposition that a mark holder has an affirmative duty to 
police all use of its mark, however, relies on dicta from a case decided over 
thirty-years ago in 1979.11  I submit that much, including trademark law, 
policy, the economy, the Internet, etc., has changed since 1979 to warrant a 
different approach even if this reference was not to gratuitous dicta. I at-
tempt to use data, rather than merely supposition, to support my contention 
that trademark bullying is happening, is happening often, and is significant 
enough to warrant Congressional action. 
Trademark bullying is an actual, measurable harm and it continues to 
grow.12  In fact, as the quality of trademark claims continues to decline, 
spurious claims increase.13  Trademark bullying itself happens as often as a 
trademark holder is awarded money damages14; it is present in at least 5.5% 
of all reported trademark cases.15  Therefore, trademark bullying is, statisti-
cally, as prevalent as money damages in trademark litigation. 
 
 8.  Vogel, supra note 1, at 505–06. 
 9.  See Ill. High Sch. Ass’n v. GTE Vantage, Inc., 99 F.3d 244, 246 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, J.) 
(“A serious trademark holder is assiduous in endeavoring to convince dictionary editors, magazine and 
newspaper editors, journalists and columnists, judges, and other lexicographically influential persons to 
avoid using his trademark to denote anything other than the trademarked good or service.”); Cullman 
Ventures, Inc. v. Columbian Art Works, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 96, 124 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (“A trademark 
owner’s efforts at policing its trademarks is further proof of the strength of those marks.”). 
 10.  See Seller Agency Council, Inc. v. Kennedy Ctr. for Real Estate Educ., 621 F.3d 981, 988 
(9th Cir. 2010) (stating that the defense of acquiescence “limits a party’s right to bring suit following an 
affirmative act by word or deed by the party that conveys implied consent to another”); Roederer v. J. 
Garcia Carrion, S.A., 569 F.3d 855, 858–59 (8th Cir. 2009) (“Laches is an equitable defense to an 
action to enforce a trademark.  Laches applies when a claimant inexcusably delays in asserts its 
claim . . .”). 
  
11. Proctor and Gamble Co. v. Johnson and Johnson, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 1185, 
1207 (S.D.N.Y 1979). 
12. See infra, Part III. 
13. See infra, Part III. 
14. See infra, Part III. 
15. See infra, Part III. 
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As such, Congress should get involved to legislate a solution.  The 
best solution is to amend Section 1117 of the Lanham Act16 to clarify that 
defendants can obtain reasonable attorney’s fees in egregious cases (like 
bullying) as well as plaintiffs.  This would encourage attorneys to take 
trademark bullying cases and represent defendants.  It would also discour-
age the prosecution of trademark cases that are only meant to harass or 
raise the cost of market access for defendants with little expectation of 
success on the merits.  Anecdotally, we also know that once represented by 
competent trademark counsel, trademark bullying cases tend to evaporate.17  
Congress should get involved to create an income stream for trademark 
counsel who represent the bullied so that trademark counsel do not have to 
do it pro bono, if the bullied entity cannot pay. 
II. Definition of Trademark Extortion 
Today, most people refer to what I dubbed trademark extortion18 as 
“trademark bullying.” Trademark bullying is a less inflammatory term to 
describe the same conduct.  Trademark extortion, or “bullying,” means the 
use of a non-famous trademark to enjoin (or seek or threaten to enjoin) a 
non-competing use by a third party. 
Some seem to presume that the relative size or capitalization of com-
panies involved in trademark disputes is generally indicative of whether 
trademark bullying is present.19  Although the relative size of a company 
may make the litigation more or less painful to fund, it does not, by defini-
tion, predict bullying.  That is, often times, large companies sue small 
companies or individuals for trademark infringement.  Most of the time, 
these cases are legitimate trademark complaints where the defendant know-
ingly or (most likely) unknowingly used the plaintiff’s mark in commerce 
in an infringing manner.  If our trademark system is legitimate and to be 
relied upon, we should not interfere with legitimate trademark infringement 
 
16. 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (2008). 
17. They evaporate and enter settlement terms that prevents the bullied party 
from speaking about the terms and conditions of the settlement.  What we do know 
indicates that these terms are often quite positive for the bullied entity including 
cash payments from the Plaintiffs themselves would brought the claim in the first 
place. 
18. Port, Extortion, supra note 1, at 585. 
19. Mark J. Miller, Trademark Wars Escalate and it’s all the Web’s Fault 
(March 5, 2012 10:01AM), 
http://www.brandchannel.com/home/post/2012/03/05/Trademark-Wars-
030512.aspx (quoting noted American trademark law expert Professor Barton 
Beebe as saying “The big companies will do this to rough up their competitors.”). 
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cases.  After all, every trademark defendant believes s/he is being bullied; 
most often, s/he is simply an infringer.20 
Thus, a more clear and helpful definition of trademark bullying is 
needed.  After researching trademark extortion for the better part of six 
years, as well as coining the term “trademark extortion,” I have come up 
with the following definition: Trademark Bullying occurs when there is 
evidence that a trademark holder asserts a non-famous mark against a non-
competing entity on or in connection with goods or services into which the 
plaintiff has no reasonable expectation of expanding. 
A trademark bully is, according to this definition, not the holder of a 
famous appellation.  The Lanham Act allows for the holders of famous 
marks to broadly assert trademark rights in the name of trademark dilu-
tion.21  Trademark bullying contemplates a situation where the party assert-
ing the trademark right would likely not prevail if the case were fully 
litigated because the parties are not competing (and there is no intention of 
competition in the future); however, if a mark is subject to dilution protec-
tion (meaning it is famous), competition becomes irrelevant.22  Therefore, 
by definition, a famous mark cannot be the subject of trademark bullying 
because a famous mark can be legitimately enforced against even non-
competing entities.23 
An axiom of American trademark jurisprudence (not dilution justifica-
tion) has been that one seller of goods should not divert consumers from 
another.24  A long time ago, Learned Hand succinctly articulated the fol-
lowing: 
 
20. In response to Trademark Extortion, some criticized me for seeming to be 
legitimizing or defending infringing conduct.  [Find the Scott Johnston quote] 
Quite to the contrary, I believe in the rule of law and the value of a predictable, 
legitimate trademark system.  Economic investment, growth and wealth all grow 
out of meeting economic expectations.  To be sure, I am not arguing for something 
that does not recognize or respect the legitimate assertion of legitimate trademark 
rights.   
21. See Port, Extortion, supra note 2 at 590 
22. See id. at 590–91. 
23.  15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2012) (“the owner of a famous mark . . . shall be 
entitled to an injunction against another person who . . . commences use of a mark 
or trade name in commerce that is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution 
by tarnishment of the famous mark, regardless of the presence or absence . . . of 
competition . . .”). 
24. See New Kids on the Block v. News America Pub., Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 
305 (9th. Cir. 1992) (noting that “the wrong protected against” by traditional 
trademark law was “[p]reventing products from free-riding on their rivals’ 
marks”); United States v. Hon, 904 F.2d 803, 806 (2d. Cir. 1990) (stating that one 
purpose of trademark law “protecting the trademark owner’s investment in the 
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The law of unfair trade comes down very nearly to this – as judges have 
repeated again and again –  that one merchant shall not divert customers 
from another by representing what he sells as emanating from the sec-
ond. This has been, and perhaps even more now is, the whole Law and 
the Prophets on the subject. . .25 
Paradoxically, there is also the so-called “unrelated goods doctrine.”26  
Some claim that its existence requires an expanded view of trademark in-
fringement and incentivizes trademark bullying.27  This doctrine recognizes 
that not all infringing conduct is on or in connection with goods or services 
that are immediately and directly competing.  If a mark is strong, the rela-
tive range of goods and services on which it may be used grows.  That is, 
the stronger the mark, the larger the range of goods and services for which 
the mark will be protected.  The stronger the mark the more distinctive the 
mark and the more likely that one or more of the multiple factors will 
viewed in favor of the plaintiff—namely the likelihood that the plaintiff 
will bridge the gap between the non-competing goods or services.28 
Each Circuit has adopted its own, distinct test for trademark infringe-
ment analysis.  Yet, many of the Circuits’ tests are very similar.  For in-
stance, five of the eleven Circuit Courts of Appeal tests for trademark in-
infringement contain an express element that is, essentially, the likelihood 
the plaintiff will bridge the gap.  Essentially, bridging the gap is the likeli-
hood that the plaintiff will in the future sell a good or service that would 
more directly compete with the defendant’s goods or services.29  Trade-
 
quality of the mark and his product’s reputation”); Kroger Co. v. Johnson & John-
son, 570 F.Supp 1055, 1060 (S.D. Ohio 1983) ([T]o permit a bystander who has 
spent a minimum of time, money, and effort in developing its product to profit by 
marketing the identical commodity with a similar name and packaging is contrary 
to state Congressional purpose of the Lanham Act.”). 
25. Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 973 (2d Cir. 1928). 
26. Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., 247 F. 407 (2d Cir. 1917), cert. 
denied, 245 U.S. 672 (1918). 
27. Leah Chan Grinvald, Shaming Trademark Bullies, 2011 WISC. L. REV. 
625, 636–37 (2011) (Although otherwise a substantively accurate piece, the author 
does claim that bullying is dependent on the relative size of the two corporations in 
a trademark dispute.  As demonstrated below, the relative size or capitalization of 
the companies may make the case more or less sympathetic but is not, in itself, a 
manifestation of bullying conduct). 
28. The weakness of relying on the “bridging the gap” element was recent 
made plain in Robert G. Bone, Taking the Confusion out of “Likelihood of Confu-
sion”: Toward a More Sensible Approach to Trademark Infringement, 106 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1307, 1340–41 (2012). 
29. See Lang v. Retirement Living Publ’g Co., 949 F.2d 576, 582 (2d Cir. 
1991) (the perception of consumers affects the likelihood of confusion because if 
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mark law is meant to be prospective30 and allow the trademark plaintiff’s 
rights to expand over time.  This expansion through the so-called related 
goods doctrine has to be objective and the record has to contain evidence 
that indicates the plaintiff actually intends such expansion or that the ex-
pansion is “natural.”31 
The assertion of a mark in a reasonable (or natural) zone of expansion, 
too, is not bullying.  Bullying contemplates enforcing trademark rights 
beyond the scope of the plaintiff’s trademark rights and beyond a reasona-
ble (or natural) expansion of those rights depending upon the strength of 
the plaintiff’s mark.  That is, whether or not bullying could or should be 
dealt with using existing rules regarding professional responsibility and the 
like, it is an extremely nuanced endeavor requiring an extremely nuanced 
analysis.  We do this serious issue no favor by making bold, across the 
spectrum claims based on no data. 
America is replete with anecdotal stories of trademark bullying where 
the only logical explanation for the conduct of the plaintiff was that it was 
engaging in bullying.  In addition to the famous examples provided by 
Vogel and Schachter, some others include the following: 
Rob Linden, a business owner that installs blown-in insulation into 
new homes, adopted the trade name (not the trademark) THERMAL WISE 
INSULATION as the name of his LLC.  Mr. Linden operates solely within 
the Minneapolis, Minnesota area.  Mr. Linden was sued by Questar, Inc. 
(“Questar”) for allegedly infringing their mark THERM-WISE to describe 
a rebate program and promotion where, as a regional monopoly in the state 
of Utah and immediate environs, it encourages people to wisely use ener-
gy.32  Although Mr. Linden and Quester operate different businesses in 
different states, Questar is attempting to make Mr. Linden stop using the 
name of his LLC.33 
 
consumers perceive bridging the gap as probable, they are more likely to believe 
that the junior user’s products emanate from the senior user). 
30. See Paco Sport, Ltd. v. Paco Rabanne Parfums, 86 F. Supp. 2d 305, 318 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (citing Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods, 73 F.3d 497, 
504 (2d Cir. 1996)) (the actual probability of bridging the gap is relevant because 
the trademark law protects, in part, the senior user’s interest in being able to ex-
pand into a related field in the future). 
31. GMA Accessories, Inc. v. Croscill, Inc., No. 06 Civ. 6236 GEL, 2007 WL 
766294, *6–7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2007). 
32. See QUESTAR GAS, http://www.thermwise.com/ (last visted Sept. 28, 
2014). (Lists “home energy plan” and the tag line “If you conserve, you save.”) 
33. See Questar Gas v. Thermal Wise Insulation, 2:12-cv-00007-DN, (Utah 
Jan. 4, 2012) (RFC Express), http://www.rfcexpress.com/lawsuits/trademark-
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Lorenzo Borghese and his family were sued by Borghese, Inc. for use 
of the name BORGHESE in connection with the sale of pet care products. 
Borghese, Inc. is the assignee of the mark PRINCESS MARCHELLA 
BORGHESE for use on, or in connection with, cosmetics.34  Unless pet 
care products are a natural extension of cosmetics for women or unless 
Borghese, Inc. has specific plans to expand into pet care products, this part 
of the law suit is best characterized as trademark bullying. 
A college student in Missouri attempted to fund his education by sell-
ing outdoor athletic gear under the appellation SOUTH BUTT, upsetting 
the manufacturers of North Face.35  Similarly, a man in Vermont attempted 
to register EAT MORE KALE, upsetting the Chick-fil-A corporation in 
light of its use of the mark EAT MOR CHIKIN (in the form of cows hold-
ing up a sign extorting such conduct—an example provided in the Vogel 
and Schachter article but they excluded the humorous context).36 
The anecdotes abound.  We are told, by people like Vogel and 
Schachter that these are not important and, ignoring any data that does 
exist, we should allow the law as it exists deal with these incidents.  With 
this article, however, there is now good data that indicates that, more likely 
than not, trademark bullying is happening and should be dealt with by 
Congressional action. 
III. DATA 
Trademark bullying cases have been, heretofore, as elusive and anec-
dotal.  Trademark plaintiffs are free to make claims of infringement, for 
legitimate or tactical reasons, without having to record or report such 
claims.  Coupled with the vagaries of the requirement that trademark hold-
ers police potential infringing uses of their marks, it becomes exceedingly 
difficult to tell when a case amounts to bullying and when it is legitimate.37 
 
lawsuits/utah-district-court/87570/questar-gas-v-thermal-wise-insulation/summary/ 
(last updated Jan. 4, 2012). 
34. Christine Haughney, Borghese v. Borghese: Battle for a Royal Name, NY 
Times, June 15, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/16/business/borghese-v-
borghese-battle-for-a-royal-name.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (last visited on 
February 11, 2015). 
35. See Jim Salter, North Face settles lawsuit against South Butt, NBC NEWS 
(April 11, 2010), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/36334733/ns/business-
consumer_news/t/north-face-settles-lawsuit-against-south-butt/#.UeyH9D5VSnw. 
36. Chick-fil-A Fails To Stop ‘Eat More Kale’ Trademark, Forbes Magazine, 
Dec. 15, 2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/christinapark/2014/12/15/chick-fil-a-
fails-to-stop-eat-more-kale-trademark/ (last visited on February 11, 2015). 
37. See Vogel, supra note 8 at 1. 
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Until now, there have been no statistical attempts to show that bully-
ing is real and/or and how frequently it happens.  The data below suggests 
that it is very real and happens at same rate that trademark plaintiffs recov-
er money damages. 
To test for trademark bullying, I looked at all reported cases since the 
inception of the Lanham Act where the defendant moved for summary 
judgment.  I used the database that I built in my original article Trademark 
Extortion.38  That database consists of every reported case that was disposi-
tively terminated in America relying on the Lanham Act.  The database 
consists of all reported cases from July 1, 1947 through 2011.  I harvested 
from that database, all cases where the defendant moved for summary 
judgment and prevailed.39 
General legal literature supports the notion that defendants are very 
unlikely to prevail in a motion for summary judgment in general subject 
matter jurisdiction.40  In fact, in general, defendants prevail in their motions 
for summary judgment only 4% of the time.41  Trademark defendants, 
however, in the last decade prevailed at 5.5% of the time or slight more 
than general litigation.  Further data would have to be collected and ana-
lyzed to determine if this difference is due to trademark bullying activity 
which may not be present or adequately represented in the general data. 
Summary judgments for defendants are a good place to test the preva-
lence of trademark bullying.  Usually, discovery has closed.42  The judge 
looks at all of the plaintiff’s evidence and, drawing all reasonable refer-
ences in favor of the plaintiff, concludes that there are no material facts in 
dispute and that the defendant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.43  
This is and should be a rare event.  For the judge to grant a motion for 
summary judgment brought by the defendant, the judge is interfering with 
the plaintiff’s chance to be heard, the chance to get a case before a jury, and 
a chance that, though not strong, it still might prevail.44  For the court to 
 
38. See Port, Extortion, supra note 2 at 611–21 
39. For a more detailed description of the methodology of this study, See infra 
Part IV. 
40. See Joe Cecil & George Cort, Report on Summ. J. Prac. Across Dists. 
with Variations in L. R. at 17, Table 12 (FJC Aug. 13, 2008), (re-analyzing 2006 
data showing a summary judgment rate of just over 4%)  
41. Id. 
42. TBMP § 528.02 (2011). 
43. See CMM. Cable Rep., Inc. v. Ocean Coast Props., Inc., 97 F.3d 1504, 
1512–13(1st Cir. 1996). 
44. Panavision Int’l L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F.Supp. 1296, 1301 (C.D. Cal. 
1996) (“summary judgment is disfavored in trademark cases because of the inher-
ently factual nature of most trademark disputes.”). 
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grant a summary judgment motion brought by the defendant, the plaintiff’s 
case must, by definition, be extremely weak.  These are the cases that most 
likely encompass instances of trademark bullying. 
There are some alarming trends when looking at the number of cases 




















4 1.87 1.4% 270 
1960-
1969 
5 1.92 1.9% 251 
1970-
1979 
14 1.84 4.5% 309 
1980-
1989 
16 1.49 2.5% 636 
1990-
1999 
40 1.41 5.8% 682 
2000-
2009 
40 1.33 5.5% 731 
 
The first obvious trend is that the raw incidents of cases where the de-
fendant is granted a summary judgment have increased.  They have not 
only increased in real terms, they have increased in relative terms.  In the 
decade ending in 1969, there were a total of 251 cases in the database.  In 
the decade ending in 2009, there were 731 cases.  In the decade ending in 
1969, this number accounted for 1.9% of the cases; by 2009, this number 
accounted for 5.5% of the cases.  That is, in relative terms, the number of 
cases where summary judgment was granted to the defendant increased 8-
times in 50 years while the rate of increase of all cases increased only by 
2.91-times.45 
 
45. Further data need must be collected and analyzed to determine the signifi-
cance of the fact that incidents of trademark bullying actually may be ameliorating 
slightly over time.  In the decade prior to the last decade, bullying claims peaked at 
5.8% of reported cases.  Although this was the same raw number of cases (40) that 
manifest bullying characteristics, the 5.5% figure cited throughout this article is a 
slight decrease from the previous peak.  That is, this is the only piece of data in my 
study that indicates Vogel and Schachter may be correct.  If this problem is going 
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Second, the average strength of the case dropped significantly during 
the same time frame.  From a high of 1.9 out of 3 for a quality score in the 
decade that ended in 1969, it reached a low of 1.33 by the decade that end-
ed in 2009.  That is, in the same 50 years, the quality of the plaintiff’s claim 
dropped by more than 71%. 
Most significantly, the rate of summary judgment being awarded to 
the defendant is now 5.5% of reported cases.  For those that feel trademark 
bullying is insignificant, marginal, and should not be studied or discussed 
further, this is an important finding.  Trademark bullying happens at the 
same rate that money damages are awarded to the plaintiff.  Statistically 
speaking, money damages are as relevant as trademark bullying. 
More significant still, this data is quite well supported by statistical 
analysis. 
A. Regression Analysis  
 
1. Strength of Claim 
 
The strength of the claim brought by the plaintiff is declining.  Statistically, 
this is well supported by regression analysis.  In this case, where Y = - 0.0103x + 
21.942.  That is, there is strong statistical evidence that indicates the strength of the 
plaintiffs’ claims is weakening over time.  Here, with a p value of 0.001, we can 
say with 99% certainty that the relative strength of trademark claims has dimin-
 
away on its own, I would not support changing the law to be responsive to bully-
ing. 
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ished over time. That is, the  regression analysis for the strength of trademark pro-
duced favorable results for the hypothesis that trademark strength in trademark 
bullying cases is declining.  We also can predict that, with no additional variables, 
the strength of the claim will continue to decrease. 
This regression analysis also tells us that the relative strength of a trademark 
claim is predicted to decrease in quality of 0.01 each year based on a case rating 
scale from 1 – 3.  For instance, if in the year 2000 the average strength of a claim 
where summary judgment was found in favor of defendant equals 1.342, then in 
2001 we can expect that the strength of claim will equal 1.332.  In one year, the 
strength of a claim is projected to fall ¾ of one percent.  That is, the quality of the 
plaintiff’s claim will continue to diminish. 
2. Degree of Similarity 
 
The degree of similarity between the plaintiff’s mark and the defendant’s mark 
has decreased since the inception of the Lanham Act in cases where the defendant 
prevailed in a motion for a summary judgment, that is, when trademark bullying 
was present.  This is statistically portrayed above and this conclusion is also quite 
accurate.  Y = - 0.0115x + 24.664 [t stat = -1.98 / p value = 0.052].  That is, the 
regression analysis for the degree of similarity between marks produced favorable 
results.  We know with 94.98% certainty that the degree of similarity between a 
plaintiff and an allegedly infringing mark has diminished since 1949.  The graph 
above describes this relationship.  Where trademark bullying is likely, plaintiffs’ 
marks are becoming more and more dissimilar to defendants’ marks and this trend 
seems to be continuing. 
1.  
3. Distinctiveness of Plaintiffs’ Marks 
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Here, the regression analysis did not support the contention that plaintiff’s 
trademarks, in general, were generally becoming weaker and less distinctive.  
Where the p-value is 0.80, no correlation can be said to exist. 
The data does show, however, an interesting trend that in fact does support the 
contention that plaintiff’s marks are becoming weaker.  Specifically, of percentage 
of cases where summary judgment was found for defendant, it became increasingly 
rare for a plaintiff to assert rights in connection with an inherently distinctive mark.  
That is, from 1980 – 1990 there were six (6) inherently distinctive marks (of 16 
cases); from 1990 – 2000, there were nine (9) inherently distinctive marks (of 40 
cases); and, from 2000 – 2010, there were only four (4) inherently distinctive 
marks (of 40 cases). 
During the period from 1980 – 1990, 38% of cases where summary judgment 
was found for defendant involved inherently distinctive marks; from 1990 – 2000, 
23%; and, from 2000 – 2010, only 10%.  Although the regression analysis does not 
support the contention that distinctiveness is declining over time, a simple consid-
eration of the percentages of cases involved, demonstratively, does support such a 
hypothesis. 
Therefore, it is safe to say that the distinctiveness of the plaintiff’s marks in 
trademark bullying cases is in a declining trend.  Fewer marks being used to en-
force rights against trademark defendants are distinctive marks. 
4. Proximity of Goods or Services 
 
 
As with the distinctiveness of plaintiffs’ marks, the regression analysis does 
not support the hypothesis that the goods or services of the plaintiffs is becoming 
more remote from defendants in cases of likely trademark bullying.  This is most 
230 CHICAGO-KENT JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY [Vol 14:1 
likely because there are excluded and unknown variables such as the expansion of 
the economy, diversity of products, etc.46 
IV. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology for this study was time consuming but quite simple.  I relied 
on the database I created for the Trademark Extortion article that I still maintain.  
This database lists all reported trademark cases in the United States that came to a 
dispositive result.  It can be found at http://web.wmitchell.edu/intellectual-
property/the-mitchell-study-on-trademark-litigation/. The database currently re-
ports 2,972 trademark cases. 
Of the 2,972 cases which had previously been coded for, among other things, 
the procedural posture of the case, I merely culled only those that reported the 
results of a summary judgment motion. Of course, these could have been complete 
summary judgment or partial summary judgment.  I did not code for this distinc-
tion.  I discovered 119 reported cases since the inception date of the Lanham Act, 
July 5, 1949, that involved a summary judgment motions. 
Even though I did not code for the distinction between partial and complete 
summary judgment motions, to be included in the study, all cases had to come to a 
dispositive result terminating the case.  Therefore, each of the 119 cases came to a 
dispositive result terminating the case or that issue in the case, but it is possible 
that another trademark-related or other cause of action permitted the case to pro-
ceed.  In each of the 119 cases, at least one trademark-related cause of action was 
met with a summary judgment where the defendant prevailed. 
Those 119 cases were then read and coded for the strength of the case.  The 
strength of the case was determined by applying the Polaroid factors.  Each case 
was coded 1-3 as to the likelihood that the plaintiff would prevail on the merits.  
Each case was read and given a score that reported its likelihood of success, one 
 
46. Leah Chan Grinvald, Shaming Trademark Bullies, 2011 WISC. L. REV. 
625, 634 (2011).  
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factor at a time.  In the end, each case received a score of 1-3 where 1 was ex-
tremely unlikely and 3 was extremely likely that the plaintiff would succeed on the 
merits. 
Obviously, this part of the study was extremely arbitrary and subjective, how-
ever, it was consistently arbitrary and/or subjective.  Two students read each case 
and determined what level of strength the case had; difficult cases were adjudicat-
ed by me.  Therefore, although subjective, it is consistent in its outcome.  Collec-
tively, one set of eyes made every judgment as to how to score the strength of each 
case.  Therefore, although subjective, the results were consistent. 
All cases were then tabulated and presented in the graphs as shown above. 
V. SIGNIFICANCE 
The significance of this study is hard to overstate.  In the battle over whether 
trademark bullying happens or not and, if so, how often, this study provides con-
clusive evidence that it is happening and it is a growing issue.  If summary judg-
ments in favor of the defendant are indicative of trademark bullying, trademark 
bullying happens in 5.5% of the reported cases in the last decade. 
The context for the number 5.5 is also startling.  In 5.5% of the reported cases, 
money damages are awarded to the plaintiff.  Therefore, trademark bullying is as 
meaningful to trademark jurisprudence as money damages. 
This study is limited by the fact that it relies exclusively on reported cases 
where the defendant prevailed in its motion for summary judgment.  Anecdotally, 
it is not hard to imagine many other cases where the defendant loses its motion for 
summary judgment.  This could be because the plaintiff’s case was stronger, mate-
rial facts were unresolved, or the individual judge rarely granted summary judg-
ments to defendants because he/she believed that every plaintiff deserves its day in 
court, etc.  This study does not address the multiple reasons why a motion for a 
summary judgment by defendant might be denied.  However, to be sure, many are 
denied.  At least some of them might reasonably be considered to be part of this 
study but, because the judge denied the motion, it is not. 
That is, 5.5% is a floor.  Trademark bullying happens at least 5.5% of the 
time. 
Also not considered in this study are all the times a defendant and victim of 
bullying simply ceases use of the mark and/or changes to a different mark.  All of 
those instances are not captured in this study.  Therefore, all the unreported cases 
where Party X sends Party Y a cease and desist letter and Party Y capitulates and 
stops using the mark or changes the mark are not part of this study.  It may be that 
some or all or some percentage of all the Party Ys in the United States may have 
prevailed in a motion for summary judgment; however, because they capitulated, 
we will never know. 
As there is no reporting requirement or registration system in the United States 
to publicize when a party sends or receives a cease and desist letter and the results, 
it is impossible to conclude how often this type of scenario happens.  However, to 
be sure, it is not never.  Therefore, 5.5% is a floor.  Trademark bullying happens at 
least 5.5% of the time. 
This is the primary finding of this study.  I respectfully disagree with claims 
made by such authors as Vogel and Schachter based on no data whatsoever that 
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bullying is best dealt with by existing law, that as sanctions such as Rule 11 are 
available to defendants, no action is required by Congress to respond to trademark 
bullying, even if it does exist.  However, in the 119 cases where the defendant 
succeeded in its motion for summary judgment, the most egregious case possible 
where the court dismissed the plaintiff’s case or cause of action with no regard for 
its rights to a day in court, Rule 11 sanctions were awarded in a total of zero cases.  
In fact, Rule 11 sanctions are very rarely awarded at all.  To posit that because a 
theoretical sanction exists, there should be no concern about the actual conduct that 
could lead to the sanction is particularly empty when the sanction is never award-
ed. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Trademark bullying (a.k.a. trademark extortion) happens in 5.5% of the re-
ported cases.  This is the same rate that plaintiffs recover any money damages.  In 
the reported cases, trademark bullying is as significant, relevant and worrisome as 
cases where the plaintiff recovers money damages.  Also, 5.5% is a floor.  Trade-
mark bullying happens at least 5.5% of the time.  Where the ceiling is cannot be 
told because there is no requirement in the United States to report or record the 
sending out of cease and desist letters or how many times a trademark holder files 
suit to enforce its marks.  Microsoft self-reports that they filed 235 law suits from 
2001-2005.47  However, nowhere are the results recorded, maintained or analyzed. 
The people that are not troubled by trademark bullying do not see evidence of 
it and therefore are not concerned.  As there is no reporting or recording require-
ment in the United States, trademark bullying, if it happens at all, can only be 
found if we use deductive reasoning.  This article is based on the deductive notion 
that cases where summary judgment was granted for the defendant are likely to 
represent cases of trademark bullying. 
In trademark bullying cases, the quality of the plaintiff’s claim is declining.  
This conclusion is supported by regression analysis that indicates that it is accurate 
to over 99% certainty. 
Trademark bullying cases are increasing.  Today, 5.5% of the reported cases 
are likely bullying cases. 
In trademark bullying cases, the degree of similarity between the marks at is-
sue has decreased over time and continues to decrease. 
In trademark bullying cases, the pace of growth of all reported trademark cas-
es during the life of the Lanham Act has grown 2.91 times while the pace of 
growth whether the defendant prevailed in a summer judgment motion has grown 
at 8 times.  That is, the growth rate of trademark bullying cases far exceeds the 
growth rate of general trademark infringement cases at large. 
As no data (just suppositions) was provided by Vogel and Schachter, it is dif-
ficult to claim they are wrong in their analysis.  Of course, Rule 11 and the other 
potential sanctions do exist.  Without knowing how often they are used in cases 
 
47. Michael Barbaro & Julie Creswell, Levi’s Turns to Suing Its Rivals, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 29, 2007, at A1 (claiming that Microsoft filed 235 infringement law 
suits from 2001–2006), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/29/business/29jeans.html. 
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that manifest trademark bullying, it is impossible to take issue with their non-
analysis.  Further, no data is relied on by the various trade organizations (simply 
outdated dicta from now ancient cases).  The data here is the first attempt to prove 
or disproved trademark bullying.  It is provided in the spirit of an academic in-
quiry.  To me, the data here supports the idea that trademark bullying deserves the 
scrutiny that would be brought to bear if Congress elected to get involved.  Clearly, 
the existing “safeguards” have been proven here to be anything but safe. 
As such, Congress should act. Congress could go a long way in stopping 
trademark bullying if it amended Section 1117 of the Lanham to make it explicit 
that trademark infringement defendants as well as plaintiffs should be awarded its 
attorney’s fees when the opposing party acts egregiously.  Attorney’s fees should 
be liberally awarded in cases where the defendant moves for summary judgment 
and prevails as these cases are the clearest manifestation of trademark bullying. 
 
